Who Takes  the Lead?: Comparative Insights on Arbitrability, the Delegation Clause, and the Supreme Court of the United States by Cavallini, Cesare
Updated_Cavallini camera ready (Do Not Delete) 1/11/2021 10:28 AM 
 
1 
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL 
 LAW JOURNAL  
VOLUME 51 FALL 2020 NUMBER 1 
 
WHO TAKES THE LEAD?: COMPARATIVE INSIGHTS ON 
ARBITRABILITY, THE DELEGATION CLAUSE, AND THE 




Determining jurisdiction on threshold issues between courts and 
arbitral tribunals is a massive debate at the international level. Although 
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arbitral agreements involve parties across all countries, different 
country-specific provisions in each country’s arbitration act shows how 
a primary issue—a dispute’s arbitrability—needs additional reform, 
aiming for a more uniform application of the competence-competence 
rule. Hence, the purpose of this Article is to evaluate the possible 
implications emerging from a U.S. Supreme Court decision on 
arbitrability and the delegation clause. This Article will also consider 
rules of additional venues, outside the boundaries of U.S. law. The two 
legal families of civil and common law play a crucial role in interpreting 
alternative dispute resolution. In particular, this Article explores how 
the competence-competence principle—generally recognized in 
European arbitration acts—should be renewed in its specific regulation, 
favoring a general negative effect, and on the contrary, concurrent 
jurisdiction by the court. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. (“Henry 
Schein”), the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously decided 
whether arbitrators or courts must take the lead on the arbitrability of a 
dispute.1 The Court examined a dispute originating from a sales 
contract containing an arbitral agreement which stated: 
Any dispute arising under or related to this Agreement (except for 
actions seeking injunctive relief and disputes related to trademarks, 
trade secrets, or other intellectual property of [Schein]), shall be 
resolved by binding arbitration in accordance with the arbitration 
rules of the American Arbitration Associations.2 
The Henry Schein case is noteworthy because it involves 
controversial topics of U.S. arbitration law, particularly the delegation 
clause of arbitrability3 and the competence-competence principle.4 
Although arbitration does not always resolve every question parties 
may have, it is considered a commonplace for resolving disputes.5 More 
precisely, the question regarding the determination of arbitral 
jurisdiction and the role of courts in solving such issues involves 
arbitration and its policies. Henry Schein and other Supreme Court 
decisions “have had the cumulative effect of eliminating virtually all 
defenses to arbitrability and converting [pre-dispute arbitral 
agreements] into ‘super contracts.’”6 Furthermore, Henry Schein 
creates an expansive interpretation of Section 2 of the Federal 
 
1. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 527 (2019). 
2. Id. at 528. 
3. Id. at 527; see also David Horton, Arbitration about Arbitration, 70 STAN. L. 
REV. 363, 363 (2018). 
4. Competence-Competence Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2019) (“The principle that arbitrators may decide challenges to their own 
jurisdiction.”); see also Robert H. Smit, Separability and Competence in International 
Arbitration: Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit? Or Can Something Indeed Come from Nothing?, 13 
AM. REV. INT’L. ARB. 19, 19 (2002). 
5. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 1631, 1631 (2005); see also Pamela K. Bookman, The Arbitration-Litigation 
Paradox, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1119, 119 (2019). 
6. Jill I. Gross, Bargaining in the (Murky) Shadow of Arbitration, 24 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 185, 196 (2019). 
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Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which began in the 1980’s as “an emphatic 
federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution.”7 
Undoubtedly, the relationship between the increasing acceptance of 
arbitration as a means of resolving disputes and the enforceability of 
contracting procedures by the arbitral agreement represents an 
extraordinary portrayal for continental legal scholars.8 It could provide 
a new perspective in considering which range of the competence-
competence principle may apply within each country-specific 
arbitration act. Additionally, we may consider the broad extension of 
parties’ consensus in reducing the role played by the judiciary’s power. 
These ideas are commonly discussed within the civil legal context. 
Thus, the purpose of this Article is to suggest a different and 
alternative view. This view requires starting with a comprehensive 
analysis of Henry Schein’s arguments and situating them within the 
U.S. legal debate on the topic. This Article will also analyze significant 
implications within the global context as well as a comparative 
overview of the arbitration acts in the common law and in Europe. 
This Article proceeds in two main stages. Part I explains how Henry 
Schein has developed new outlooks on the traditional debate on arbitral 
jurisdiction. Diving deeper into these views, one may discover ways to 
reframe the discussion on separability and the competence-competence 
principle. Part II connects the comparative legal analysis with the 
implications of those arguments on existing rules set by arbitration law 
in civil legal systems. Finally, this Article’s conclusion offers new rules 
that may be adopted, irrespective of a few variances in both legal 
families, suggesting a more global vision for arbitration law.  
I. THE HENRY SCHEIN V. ARCHER & WHITE CASE 
A. Background and Legal Issues 
The Henry Schein case discusses whether a court may neglect a 
delegation clause on the arbitrability issue when the argument in favor 
of arbitration is wholly groundless.9 In Henry Schein, Archer & White 
 
7. Id. at 195. 
8. Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 593-94 
(2005); see also Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 511 (2011). 
9. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 528 (2019). 
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Sales, Inc. (“Archer & White”) brought a lawsuit against Henry Schein, 
Inc. (“Schein”) for violations of antitrust law, requesting injunctive 
relief as one of the remedies.10 Schein defended itself by using its 
delegation clause to compel arbitration.11 Archer & White argued that 
the dispute was not subject to the delegation clause.12 However, 
Schein’s response petition argued that the exception to arbitrability was 
in contrast to the FAA and the delegation clause on arbitrability must 
be respected, even if the court assumed the argument in favor of 
arbitration was wholly groundless.13  
Consequently, several threshold issues emerged from the parties’ 
dispute. The first arises from the arbitration agreement itself. The 
agreement expressly referred to the American Arbitration Association 
(“AAA”) rules regarding the competence-competence clause’s relation 
to the case’s arbitrability.14 Despite AAA’s rules, the delegation clause 
was unclear because it is was not absolute. The clause provides 
exceptions to arbitrability for certain claims, including injunctive relief. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision to follow that exception and held in favor of Archer & 
White.15 The Fifth Circuit found the case could not be subject to 
mandatory arbitration.16 Accordingly, the Court held that the 
arbitrability issue and the delegation clause provision were not binding 
in reaching their conclusion.17 This argument was crucial to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s reasoning. 
Schein argued to the U.S. Supreme Court that the wholly 
groundless exception violated the FAA. The Court rejected four 
arguments raised by Archer & White on the wholly groundless 
exception.18 The Court decided that, according to FAA rules, courts do 
not have the power to determine the arbitrability issue when the parties’ 
 




14. Id. at 528. 
15. Archer & White Sales, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 878 F.3d 488, 497-98 (5th 
Cir. 2017), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 524 (2019). 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 496. 
18. Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 530. 
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contract textually delegates that issue to the arbitrators.19 In other 
words, courts cannot override the contract because the wholly 
groundless exception is inconsistent with the FAA. 
B. The Decision’s Arguments 
The Court’s decision in Henry Schein and the arguments on which 
the decision is grounded are fascinating for legal scholars. As we will 
see, Henry Schein’s central holding is open to the possibility that the 
existing rules on arbitration in civil law countries will be significantly 
changed and renewed. The U.S. Supreme Court grounds its opinion on 
precedent. Henry Schein, therefore, outlines an evolution of its 
decision’s path and was specifically focused on the relation between the 
wholly groundless exception and the delegation clause previously 
signed by the parties in the contract.  
Specifically, the Court premises its opinion on relevant precedents, 
which set forth several cornerstones. First, the Court reaffirmed that 
“unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the 
question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by 
the court, not the arbitrator.”20 Second, the Court focuses its opinion on 
the crucial implications of the delegation clause.21 The Court expressly 
cites AT&T Technologies and held “a court may not ‘rule on the 
potential merits of the underlying claim’ that is assigned by contract to 
an arbitrator, ‘even if it appears to the court to be frivolous.’”22 
These considerations pair with the discussion of the delegation 
clause in determining who takes the lead in accordance with the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in First Options of Chicago Inc. v. Kaplan 
(“First Options”)23 and the more recent determinations set forth in 
Rent-A-Center.24 These decisions revolve around the clear and 
unmistakable written language of the delegation clause to determine the 
court’s lack of jurisdiction in deciding the arbitrability issue in the case. 
 
19. Id. at 526. 
20. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Commc’n Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 
(1986). 
21. Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 530. 
22. Id. at 529 (citing AT&T Technologies, 475 U.S. at 649-650).   
23. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
24. Rent -A-Center, W., Inc., v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010). 
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Accordingly, Henry Schein confirmed these decisions. However, 
by ruling that courts must respect a clear and unmistakable delegation 
clause, the Court rejected the wholly groundless exception and 
considered it in contrast with the FAA.25 A clear and unmistakable 
delegation clause inhibits courts to determine who takes the lead to 
attribute the jurisdiction on a dispute. 
Among the four arguments on which the U.S. Supreme Court 
grounded its decision, the first has already been indirectly examined. 
Archer & White assumed that, according to the FAA rules, the Court 
must first decide the arbitrability issue because the proceedings must 
cease after the court is satisfied on the arbitral jurisdiction.26 The Court 
ruled in favor of the delegation clause as the pillar of the exclusive 
arbitrators’ power on the arbitrability issue.27 In other words, the 
existence of a delegation clause within the arbitral agreement implies a 
self-determination of jurisdiction. 
The second argument refers to the FAA rules concerning judicial 
review of the final arbitral award. This argument is common in 
arbitration regulatory regimes all over the world as the primary form of 
complementarity between the courts and the arbitral tribunals. In Henry 
Schein, the Court held FAA rules do not allow courts to decide on the 
arbitrability issue first.28 On the contrary, a clear and unmistakable 
delegation clause is enough to limit the arbitrators power to freely 
decide first on that threshold question.29 
In the third argument, the Court moved to a twofold consideration, 
in which injunctive relief emerged as contradictory to the case. The first 
consideration involves the various and divergent evaluation of what 
might be considered groundless because “an arbitrator might hold a 
different view of the arbitrability issue than a court does, even if the 
court finds the answer obvious.”30 Second, the Court noted that 
allowing it to first decide the arbitrability issue “would inevitably spark 
collateral litigation (with briefing, argument, and opinion writing), over 
whether a seemingly unmeritorious argument for arbitration is wholly 
 
25. Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 531. 
26. Id. at 530. 
27. Id. at 531. 
28. Id. at 527. 
29. Id. at 530. 
30. Id. at 531. 
7
Cavallini: Who Takes  the Lead?: Comparative Insights on Arbitrability, the
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2020
Updated_Cavallini camera ready (Do Not Delete) 1/11/2021  10:28 AM 
8 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51 
groundless, as opposed to groundless.”31  That is, on the contrary, 
exactly what parties were seeking to avoid through the arbitral 
agreement, particularly the delegation clause. 
The last argument is also grounded in policy. Archer & White 
argued the wholly groundless exception is needed to deter compelling 
arbitration.32 The Court found this argument incoherent because 
“arbitrators can efficiently dispose of frivolous cases by quickly ruling 
that a claim is not in fact arbitrable.”33 Further, the Court enhanced this 
argument by introducing indirect coercive measures for the parties 
standing for frivolous motions.34 These measures included compelling 
arbitration through the wholly groundless exception by imposing fee 
and cost-shifting sanctions.35 
C. Implications Toward a Global Scenario 
The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that “when the parties’ contract 
delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, the courts must 
respect the parties’ decision as embodied in the contract.”36 In so doing, 
the Court first strengthens its precedents, setting the rule of enforcing 
the arbitral agreement as it is written.37 Concurrently, Henry Schein 
leaves unanswered the related question of whether a delegation clause 
that is incorporated in the arbitral agreement under AAA rules satisfies 
the standard of clear and unmistakable words that qualifies as 
delegation authority under First Options.38 
Regardless of whether the text of delegation clauses prompted by 
AAA or similar arbitral organizations fits the clear and unmistakable 
standard, the implications raised by Henry Schein’s arguments 
represent the starting point in partially rethinking the competence-
competence rule as well as the related separability rule.39 The inherent 







36. Id. at 528. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 531. 
39. Id. 
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whenever it can be qualified as clear and unmistakable on the 
arbitrability issue. The issue is the question of who takes the lead to 
deliver such interpretation. This gives credence to the rejected wholly 
groundless exception.40 There is not a matter of concurrent jurisdiction 
between courts and the arbitral tribunals; there is instead a matter of the 
competence-competence rule’s application, related to the willingness 
declared by the parties in the agreement’s clauses. 
Nevertheless, moving toward a comparative context implies that 
the competence-competence rule is universally known and adopted 
differently in each country. The fascinating new term of comparison, 
therefore, is to evaluate whether the U.S. precedents—as investigated 
in Henry Schein—can suggest possible reforms in the continental 
arbitration acts as introduced by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
II. THE COMPARATIVE VIEW 
A. Framing the Debate on Arbitral Jurisdiction: 
The Role of the Comparative View 
Why might a comparative analysis help explain the current debate 
on the arbitral delegation clause relaunched by Henry Schein? The 
answer lies in turning back to the origins of the arbitral delegation 
clause and, more specifically, to the terms established before the recent 
U.S. Supreme Court decision. It is worth discussing the competence-
competence rule in the continental arbitration acts to help establish a 
global and harmonized rule.   
On the one hand, Henry Schein undoubtedly supports a new venue 
on the classical debate on arbitral jurisdiction. Thus, a global 
comparative perspective is needed since the U.N. Commission on 
International Trade Law (“UNCITRIL”) proposed a soft-law to focus 
the debate around each country’s arbitration rules.41 On the other hand, 
while the international debate can be viewed in the light of Henry 
Schein’s arguments, the disparity between each arbitration act in the 
western legal tradition can be reduced to a more straightforward and 
efficient provision.  
 
40. Id. 
41. Susan Block-Lieb, Soft and Hard Strategies: The Role of Business in the 
Crafting of International Commercial Law, 40 MICH. J. INT’L L. 433, 456 (2019). 
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B. The Scope of the Competence-Competence Principle in the United 
States: A Brief Overview 
One of the most important aspects of both domestic and 
international arbitration law is preventing a jurisdictional conflict. The 
solution to these jurisdictional conflicts is found in the competence-
competence principle.42 Since it has been rightly defined as the 
“conceptual cornerstone” of international arbitration law, this principle 
moves from the assumption that access to the courts within parallel 
proceedings also demands the allocation of jurisdiction.43 This is 
problematic because it risks one party delaying the process. 
Accordingly, a balance between legitimacy and efficiency of the 
arbitration process could be conditioned by prejudices relating to the 
necessary interference of the courts as they determine jurisdiction on 
the merits. 
For this reason, it is essential to begin with a brief examination of 
the U.S. mainstream view on this issue. The FAA rules do not involve 
specific provisions that come close to the competence-competence 
principle as it is traditionally understood and reflected by the domestic 
statutory law of other countries, including common law systems, with 
the exception of Section 4.44 This Section indirectly provides: 
“[t]he court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the 
making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply 
therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the 
parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement.”45 
However, U.S. courts traditionally construe the FAA rules as 
providing courts the power to resolve issues on arbitral jurisdictions 
before the suit is over.46 The first FAA rules were interpreted in a 
moderately conservative manner in accordance with the competence-
 
42. GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1046 (2d ed. 
2014). 
43. Id. 
44. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1925). 
45. Id. 
46. William W. Park, Annotation, Arbitral Jurisdiction in the United States: 
Who Decides What?, 1 INT. A.L.R. 33, 37 (2008). 
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competence principle.47 The primary purpose of these rules was to 
authorize the court to decide particularly debated issues before any 
other arbitral determination.48 While the U.S courts were providing for 
the interlocutory judicial determination of the jurisdiction allocation of 
the dispute, the courts were also opening the door to an alternative way 
of interpretation: no contract, no power.49 
Despite this preliminary guidance, the key issue for determining 
whether the competence-competence principle can operate within the 
FAA rules is notably rooted in the U.S. Supreme Court decision in First 
Options.50 First Options’ approach to arbitrability is the opposite of the 
classic opinion previously adopted. As such, Sections 2 and 3 of the 
FAA had to be interpreted as conferring jurisdiction exclusively on the 
courts.51 Although largely only implied, First Options acknowledged 
that the FAA recognized the competence-competence of the arbitrators 
within their own jurisdiction.52 It therefore changed the classic 
approach by adopting a contractual interpretation of the arbitration 
clause. Under this approach, the arbitrator’s power to establish its 
jurisdiction on the merits can be rooted exclusively in the language of 
the parties in making a clear and unmistakable reference to the adoption 
of the competence-competence principle.53 
First Options suggests a possible finality of the arbitral tribunal’s 
exclusive power to rule on its jurisdiction over the matter in law. 
Ultimately, the Court encourages parties to pursue arbitration when 
they have clearly and unmistakably agreed to the application of 
that principle.54 This connection between courts and the arbitral 
tribunals, considering “arbitration is simply a matter of contract,”55 




49. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy, 995 F. 2d 649, 650 (6th Cir. 1993). 
50. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 940 (1995). 
51. Shirin Philipp, Is the Supreme Court Bucking the Trend? First Options v. 
Kaplan In Light of European Reform Initiatives in Arbitration Law, 14 B.U. INT’L L.J. 
119, 135 (1996); Adrianna Dulic, First Options of Chicago, Inc v. Kaplan and the 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle, 2 PEPP. DISP. RES. L.J. 77, 77-78 (2001). 
52. First Options, 514 U.S. at 938. 
53. Id. at 944 (quoting AT&T Technologies, 475 U.S. at 649). 
54. Id. at 944. 
55. Id. at 938. 
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arbitration law. First, despite the public context of ordinary courts’ 
jurisdiction, there is a contractual view of arbitration.56 Second, there is 
a preference for the courts to declare its jurisdiction when the parties to 
the contract did not “certainly” agree on the arbitrators’ competence-
competence.57 
These conclusions enhance the arguments discussed in Rent-A-
Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (“Rent-A-Center”), where the U.S. 
Supreme Court analyzed the doctrine of delegation agreement as 
separate from the overall core agreement.58 In addition, Rent-A-Center 
focuses on a different but primary argument to legitimize the delegation 
clause. According to the separability doctrine and its interpretation 
notably raised by the Court and subsequent literature, the delegation 
clause has to be treated as an independent arbitration agreement.59 Rent-
A-Center thus distinguishes between (1) the validity and enforceability 
of that delegation clause; and (2) the determination of the First Options’ 
requirements on the “clear and unmistakable” language of the 
agreement.60 
While First Options ruled courts should look to the parties’ intent 
to determine the dispute’s arbitrability,61 Rent-A-Center further defined 
intent within a separate party’s agreement, such as the delegation 
clause.62 Henry Schein determined the wholly groundless exception to 
the delegation clause was inconsistent with inhibiting arbitrators from 
determining jurisdiction.63 Henry Schein ruled that the delegation 
clause was a separate agreement utilized solely by arbitrators to help 
 
56. Id. at 943. 
57. Id. at 944. 
58. Rent -A-Center, W., Inc., v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 70 (2010). 
59. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood and Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 411 (1967); 
see also Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About “Separability” 
in Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM R. INT’L. ARB 1 (2003); John J. Barceló III, 
Who Decides the Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction? Separability and Competence-
Competence in Transnational Perspective, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 1115, 1119 
(2003); George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in International Commercial 
Arbitration, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 21 (2012). 
60. Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 66 (discussing the district court’s prior ruling on 
the contractual language). 
61. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). 
62. Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 79. 
63. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 531 
(2019). 
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determine the arbitrator’s threshold issues.64 This occurs regardless of 
any questions on the clause’s validity, at first glance, and follows First 
Options standards as to determine the parties’ actual intent in such 
delegation. The change in power allocation regarding arbitral tribunals’ 
jurisdiction, as it is stigmatized by the contractual view developed by 
First Options and Rent-A-Center, entails the evolution of the negative 
role assigned to arbitrators as institutional judges. First Options and 
Rent-A-Center must be viewed as expressing a favorable view of 
arbitrators who must decide whether the parties have agreed that the 
decision to arbitrate should be clear and unmistakable. 
First Options authorizes courts to decide on any competence-
competence principle that an arbitral agreement may contain.65 The 
courts decide on the parties’ clear intentions as to an arbitrator’s power 
to determine jurisdictional issues and whether the parties agreed to give 
arbitrators power to rule on the arbitrability issues. First Options 
certainly reinvigorates the notion of arbitrability and moves away from 
considering arbitrators as private judges remunerated by fees. However, 
in light of First Options, the FAA rules preserve the prominent role of 
the courts regarding this matter of law, even if an optimistic 
interpretation would give the parties the exclusive power to choose who 
is called upon to decide the allocation of jurisdiction. 
The cornerstone of such a controversial matter partially changes 
with Henry Schein. First, arbitration is favored because it assigns a 
proactive role to arbitrators: “arbitrators can efficiently dispose of 
frivolous cases by quickly ruling that a claim is not in fact arbitrable.”66 
This argument endorses trust for arbitrators. It also rejects the wholly 
groundless exception as a matter of a court’s competence and assigns 
due respect to the delegation clause. Because arbitration is a private 
matter, whether the parties intend to delegate arbitrators to decide 
jurisdiction on the threshold issues, such as arbitrability, remains 
salient. 
Therefore, even though Henry Schein focused on the wholly 
groundless exception in light of the delegation clause, the decision did 
not fully address jurisdiction in relation to First Option’s requirements 
when a delegation clause is present. In particular, the consideration of 
 
64. Id. 
65. First Options, 514 U.S. at 945. 
66. Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 531. 
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the concurrent jurisdictions between courts and arbitrators, which could 
be raised by Henry Schein, is that the “time-consuming sideshow” may 
assign arbitrators exclusive power to determine the jurisdiction.67 This 
occurs when the delegation clause is known by incorporating some 
tribunal rules (in this case, the AAA rules) because the incorporation 
must be considered clear and unmistakable evidence of delegation.68  
This central issue is deeply treated by the Restatement (Third), and 
the opinion is generally contrary to “render exclusive the competence 
of arbitral tribunals to make jurisdictional determination.”69 It is worth 
noting that the arbitrability issue is considered in light of the parties’ 
consensus. The parties are entitled “to delegate to an arbitral tribunal 
primary authority over whether a given dispute falls within the scope of 
an arbitration agreement.”70 The rationale is quite simple. It moves 
from the belief that “whether a given dispute falls within the scope of 
an arbitration agreement is ultimately a question of contract 
interpretation.”71 
The final questions are, given the well-established distinction 
between gateway and non-gateway issues,72 how Henry Schein may 
impact all threshold issues of arbitration proceedings, including the 
other gateway issues? In other words, could the delegation clause 
assign exclusive jurisdiction to arbitral tribunals even if different 
gateway issues are involved, such as the validity of the arbitral 
agreement? Henry Schein allows a renewed view for replying to those 
questions while also serving as a useful case comparison to other legal 
systems and statutory arbitration laws.  
Additionally, the question of whether a competence-competence 
clause in an arbitration agreement justifies the arbitrators’ exclusive 
jurisdiction on the validity of the same agreement has been widely 
debated. Such concepts have been discussed in Rent-A-Car and Henry 
Schein. While the former decision considers the delegation of the 
unconscionability of the arbitral agreement to arbitrators sufficiently 
 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 530. 




72. George A Bermann, The “Gateway Problem” in International Commercial 
Arbitration, 37 YALE J. INT.’L L. 1, 3 (2012). 
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clear and unmistakable, the latter enforces the parties’ intentions, 
revealing itself as the cornerstone of arbitration. The U.S. Supreme 
Court refers to the “contract as written,”73 which could represent the 
key issue by which it would not be surprising if the written intention of 
the parties is sufficient to exclude the discretional interpretation by the 
court on what is clear and unmistakable or not. 
The “carve-out” provision within a broadly worded arbitration 
agreement could be interpreted differently if the agreement refers to the 
application of tribunal rules. It is worth noting that district courts still 
hold “reference to AAA rules in the Consulting agreement does not, by 
itself, evidence clear and unmistakable intent to delegate the question 
of arbitrability to the arbitrator”74 where the arbitration clause “includes 
a carve out provision that expressly reserves certain issues for the 
courts.”75 Nevertheless, the consideration of the parties’ intent in Henry 
Schein is a crucial and distinctive signal of what courts want—what 
courts have expressly written—and might move toward a clear and 
unmistakable interpretation. This could suggest a twofold trend. First, 
a written contract allows a clear and unmistakable indication that the 
parties want arbitrators rather than courts to resolve their disputes. 
Since they are written in the delegation clause, they carve out certain 
remedies showing the parties’ willingness to arbitrate all disputes that 
were not carved out by the written exception. Second, the implication 
is that claims brought to the court on the arbitrability issue must be 
declined and readdressed to the arbitral tribunal, even if at first glance 
the arbitration agreement on the claim is wholly groundless. 
Given this renewed scenario, a comparative view is necessary. The 
comparative view allows us to consider a broader understanding of how 
these provisions are regulated in common law and civil legal systems, 
and also how these provisions were suggested by the soft law in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law (“Model Law”). In acknowledging this set of 
rules at the international level, it would be useful to move toward a 
renewed provision on the arbitral jurisdiction and the role of courts. 
This may serve a global scenario and stand in favor of arbitration in 
accordance with the Henry Schein decision. 
 
73. Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 529. 
74. Armor All/STP Prod. Co. v. TSI Prod., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 3d 156, 165 (D. 
Conn. 2018)  
75. Id. at 164. 
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C. The Comparative Approach 
The delegation clause and the Henry Schein decision’s implications 
on arbitrators’ authority lie within a national legal system that, in the 
absence of the clause, permits interim judicial decisions on arbitrability 
issues before any arbitral resolution. Courts are relatively free to decide 
jurisdictional issues either before arbitral tribunals’ determinations or 
through a de novo review on the challenged award.76 However, issues 
with concurrent jurisdiction occur when parties do not have clear intent 
to delegate the jurisdiction to arbitrators.77 Thus, while U.S. law 
acknowledges the competence-competence principle on a contractual 
basis,78 when the delegation clause is agreed on by the parties, a wholly 
groundless arbitration agreement will not avoid the arbitrators’ 
competence on all arbitrability threshold issues.79 In theory, this Article 
may present a favorable view of this approach. It is inspired by a 
coherent vision of arbitration as a matter of consent. 
This consideration is relevant in approaching a comparative view 
on the allocation of jurisdictional competence between courts and 
arbitral tribunals to stimulate a more uniform global regulation. In the 
following paragraphs, this Article will analyze how each system, given 
a statutory law provision of the competence-competence principle, can 
favor arbitration while balancing rapidity with efficiency. Additionally, 
this Article will consider how the increasing frequency of parties’ 
consent in the U.S. legal system might offer different perspectives. 
D. The Influence of the Model Law and Country-Specific Provisions 
This section will offer a comparative view of the implications of 
arbitral jurisdiction according to the key issues discussed above. 
Disregarding U.S. arbitration law, each country-specific rule more or 
less affirms the competence-competence principle and regulates this 
matter in an arbitration act. These rules are inspired by the UNCITRAL 
 
76. Park, supra note 46, at 39. 
77. Id. at 41. 
78. Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 527 (2019). 
79. Id. at 529. 
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Model Law.80 In particular, Article 16(1) of the Model Law allows the 
arbitral tribunal to challenge its own jurisdiction and determine the 
validity and scope of the arbitration agreement.81 
This conclusion, known as a positive effect of the competence-
competence principle, seems to be applied irrespective of the intentions 
of the parties to the arbitral agreement. However, this general rule 
should not mislead. Article 16 of the Model Law does not resolve many 
relevant issues related to the allocation of jurisdiction between the 
arbitral tribunal and the court. According to Articles 8(1) and (2), the 
court can decide on such issues before any determination by the 
arbitrators. These provisions allow the arbitral tribunal to take make 
decisions even if the action was already brought in a court, so it grants 
and legitimates the parallel proceeding as an unavoidable event that 
characterizes litigation in arbitration. Moreover, the text of Article 8(1) 
suggests that, when courts are asked to decide whether or not the arbitral 
agreement is null, void or incapable of being performed, the courts 
provide a full interlocutory determination instead of a prima facie basis 
of evaluation.82 This has been the traditional interpretation of Article 
8(1) based on the drafting history and rejection of the proposal to amend 
Article 8(1) in terms of requiring prima facie review rather than a full 
interlocutory judicial review on the arbitrators’ jurisdiction.83 
Article 8(2) of the Model Law generally regulates the conduct of 
the parallel proceedings on jurisdictional issues. It authorizes the 
arbitrators to continue the arbitral proceedings even though it is pending 
a court’s challenge to jurisdiction. On the other hand, Article 8(2) 
provides a similar power to the court in a differing situation. The Model 
Law produces more questions than answers and more doubts than 
 
80. See U.N. Commission on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985, with amendments as adopted in 
2006 (Vienna: United Nations, 2008) U.N. Doc. A/40/17, annex I.   
81. Id. art. 16(1). 
82. Frédérick Bachand, Does Article 8 of the Model Law Call for Full or Prima 
Facie Review of the Arbitral Tribunal’s Jurisdictions, 22 ARB. INT’L, 463-73 (2006) 
(suggesting how permitting a full judicial review on the arbitral jurisdiction could 
“seriously imperil the internal coherence” of the Model Law). 
83. Report on the Working Group on International Contract Practices on the 
Work of Its Fifth Session, XIV UNCITRAL Y.B. 60, 67, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/233 
(1983). 
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certainties. In particular, a court may decide jurisdictional issues before 
the arbitrators. 
Not surprisingly, some national arbitration laws decide the issues 
on arbitral jurisdiction by interpreting the parallel proceeding between 
the court and the arbitral tribunal as a common framework. Some courts 
“[restrict] the function of the court so as to provide the tribunal with the 
first opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction and the validity of the 
arbitration agreement.”84 This is primarily referred to as the so-called 
negative effect.85 The negative effect principle “evidences more 
variation in approach between jurisdictions and has generated more 
debate internationally.”86 
1. German Law 
While it is arguable that the German legal system is considered the 
original source of the competence-competence principle, some 
amendments are codified in Section 1032 of the German Code of Civil 
Procedure.87 In fact, the Model Law rules established in Articles 8 and 
16, following the enactment of the 1998 German Arbitration Act, 
resemble Sections 1032 and 1040 of the German Code of Civil 
Procedure. Additionally, Section 1032(2) is in favor of the immediate 
issue by the arbitrators of a partial interlocutory award concerning 
jurisdiction which may be challenged immediately before the courts.88 
The German law provides that any proceedings brought before the court 
on arbitral jurisdiction may only be brought if the arbitral tribunal has 
not been constituted and arbitral proceedings are not yet pending. In 
this case, the court’s decision is on the jurisdictional issue’s merits as 
such with a typical full judicial review. 
 
84. Ozlem Susler, The Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal: A Transnational 
Analysis of the Negative Effect of Competence, 6 MACQUARIE J. BUS. L. 119, 125 
(2009). 
85. Id. at 127. 
86. Id. 
87. See ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [CODE OF CIV. PROC.], § 1032, translation 
at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_zpo/englisch_zpo.html#p3558; See 
also Peter Schlosser, La nouvélle legislation allemande sur l’arbitrage, REV. ARB. 
291, 298 (1998). 
88. Id. § 1032(2). 
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Since Section 1032(3) tolerates the constitution of an arbitral 
tribunal notwithstanding an action on arbitral jurisdiction brought 
before the court, the parallel proceedings determine a complicated 
situation. The final award, set forth by the arbitral tribunal that decided 
to continue its proceeding, can be annulled by the court of appeal, 
whenever the parallel court has decided on the lack of the arbitral 
jurisdiction. This rule seems to indicate that German law only partially 
shares the competence-competence principle. The essence of the 
German arbitration law is that, once the parallel proceeding on the 
jurisdictional issue is pending, the decision set by the court is binding 
for all parties and arbitrators as it represents a full review. 
The decisive influence of the Model Law has favoured a significant 
change in previously posed arguments under the German law. 
Conclusively, the power of arbitrators over their own jurisdiction does 
not result from a subclause, similar to the U.S. delegation clause, of the 
arbitral agreement. Rather it arises directly by the operation of law, 
although it is not entirely exclusive due to the possibility of an 
immediate challenge before the courts. Unlike the 1998 German 
Arbitration Act’s approach to previous legislation, which was more 
clearly aligned with the U.S. model as set forth by First Options, current 
German Law seeks to set aside the rule providing for the application of 
a genuine competence-competence clause.89 Thus, while German law 
allows for the immediate challenge of the interlocutory award on 
jurisdiction, the parallel possibility for the arbitral tribunal to guide the 
proceedings, and does not permit a separate agreement of the parties 
and delegates jurisdictional issues to arbitrators, it leaves the last word 
to the court.90 
Although there are contrary opinions in the literature, by which the 
“parties are able to waive judicial review of issues affecting private 
interest,”91 the leading interpretation is that courts must have a crucial 
role in giving effect to arbitral agreements. As we shall see in the 
following sections, European systems allow the courts to determine the 
issue of jurisdiction before the arbitral proceedings have been formally 
 
89. Barceló III, supra note 59, at 1131. 
90. Walter Habscheid, Zur Kompetenz-Kompetenz nach der Neuen 
Schiedsrecht, FESTSCHRIFT PETER SCHLOSSER 247 (2005). 
91. REINHOLD GEIMER ET AL., ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG, §1059, Par. 8 (30th ed. 
2013). 
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initiated. Moreover, the Model Law legitimizes the parallel proceedings 
as a normal framework to solve arbitral jurisdictional issues, remaining 
silent on a specific provision such as a delegation clause by parties who 
decided on the arbitral agreement.92 
2. The United Kingdom and Italian Law 
The Model Law has undoubtedly influenced the 1996 United 
Kingdom (“U.K.”) Arbitration Act. Thus, it makes detailed provisions 
concerning the relationship between arbitral tribunals and courts, 
mainly inspired by the provisions of Article 8(1) of the Model Law.93 
Nevertheless, viewed as a whole, Sections 9, 30-32, and 67 of the 1996 
U.K. Arbitration Act provide a set of rules that shape an approach to 
competence-competence issues different than the Model Law and 
similar to the U.S. rule in light of Henry Schein. 
Section 30(1) of the Model Law recognizes the competence-
competence principle in which both the validity of the arbitral 
agreement and the arbitrability issue are generally submitted to the 
arbitrators’ decision “unless otherwise agreed by the parties.”94 Several 
English decisions recognize the competence-competence principle 
even if they specify that arbitral tribunals are merely the first tribunal 
in its own jurisdiction. For example, there is the possibility of a 
subsequent de novo judicial review by the court of appeal that addresses 
both the jurisdictional issues and the merits of the case.95 
Although the U.K Arbitration Act recognizes the parties’ right to 
have an interlocutory decision by the court on arbitral jurisdiction 
absent a contrary clause, Section 9 applies for a stay of legal 
proceedings in order to give to the written arbitration agreement the 
 
92. See Alan Rau, The Arbitrability Question Itself, 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 
287, 349 (1999). 
93. Thomas E. Carbonneau, A Comment on the 1996 United Kingdom 
Arbitration Act, 22 TUL. MAR. L. J. 131, 143 (1998); see also John J. Barcelo III, 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz and Its Negative Effects–A Comparative View (Sep. 11, 2017), 
Cornell Legal Studies Reseach Paper No. 16-40. 
94. Peter Aeberli, Jurisdictional Disputes under the Arbitration Act 1996: A 
Procedural Route Map, 21 ARB. INT. 253, 253 (1996). 
95. Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v. Privalov [2007] UKHL 40; see also Dallah 
Real estate & Tourism Holding Co. v. Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46. 
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prior effect.96 Section 9 explains a matter covered by the arbitration 
agreement is brought before the court.97 These legal provisions 
highlight the court’s discretional power when it decides on the 
jurisdiction in order to consider the validity of the arbitration agreement 
itself. 
These rules have been adopted to grant a decision by the arbitrators 
concerning their jurisdiction as quickly as possible, which may be 
subject to appeal. The parties may also ask the arbitrators to give an 
immediate partial award concerning the jurisdiction of the tribunal, 
thereby avoiding any delay in the review of that decision by the courts. 
Furthermore, in Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v. Privalov the House 
of Lords notably stated: 
The construction of an arbitration clause should start from the 
assumption that the parties, as rational businessmen, are likely to 
have intended any dispute arising out of the relationship into which 
they have entered to be decided by the same tribunal. The clause 
should be construed under this presumption unless the language 
makes it clear that certain questions were intended to be excluded 
from the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.98 
It is consistent with the broader systematic framework of other legal 
provisions in the U.K. Arbitration Act, including Section 30(2) and 
Section 67. The court may stay the proceedings brought before it and 
refer the decision to the arbitral tribunal under two circumstances. First, 
this can be done when the latter has already been established and 
arbitral proceedings are pending. Second, it may also occur when U.K. 
law provides for an early judicial review of any partial award on 
jurisdiction issued by the arbitral tribunal. Sections 9(1) and (4) 
properly balance the legitimacy and the efficiency of the arbitral 
proceedings since “if such early review is available, then the potential 
unfairness and inefficiency of sending a non-contenting party to the 
arbitration is significantly reduced.”99 
To the contrary, Section 32 provides that a party may request the 
court to determine the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. Under this 
 
96. Carbonneau, supra note 96, at 137; Aeberli, supra note 97, at 278. 
97. Carbonneau, supra note 96, at 137. 
98. Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v. Privalov [2007] UKHL 40. 
99. Barcelo III, supra note 96, at 29. 
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section, the courts may give its decisions on jurisdiction either with the 
permission of the arbitrators or if all parties agree.100 The arbitrators 
will only grant such jurisdiction to the courts if the application 
submitted to the court does not constitute a strategic delay. In any case, 
the court must determine there are good reasons to decide on the 
jurisdiction in the place of the arbitral tribunal.101 
The viewpoint of the proceedings’ economic efficiency inspired the 
1996 U.K. Arbitration Act. Whenever a party brings a lawsuit, the court 
has the discretional power to refer the jurisdictional issue to 
arbitration.102 “The court looks for the most economical way to decide 
where the real dispute should be resolved: …that is a matter of 
discretion, not jurisdiction.”103 Moreover, it is worth noting that, when 
the parties challenge the arbitration agreement’s scope, the U.K. courts 
usually refer the decision to arbitrators.104 
Finally, a brief survey on the Italian arbitration law suggests the 
same conclusion about the potentially misleading parallel proceeding 
as a compromise solution. According to Articles 817 and 819 of the 
Italian Code of Civil Procedure, the Italian law establishes a preference 
for arbitration. The law enhances the arbitrators’ power to determine 
their own jurisdiction when the arbitral tribunal is constituted, 
irrespective of the fact that the same issue is already pending in court.105 
Nevertheless, the recognized application of the competence-
competence principle is only partial. It newly fights against the 
legitimation of the parallel proceeding and the court’s power to decide 




101. See Vale do Rio Doce Navegacoa v. Shangai Bao Steel Ocean Shipping 
Co. [2000] EWHC 205 (holding that Section 32 sets out the exceptional grounds on 
which the court may become involved in the decision concerning the jurisdiction of 
the arbitrators). 
102. See Excalibur Ventures LLC v. Texas Keystone Inc. [2011] EWHC 1624; 
see also 1998 English Civil Procedure Rules 1998 62.8, § 3 (UK). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. See CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (It.), translated in COMMENTARY ON THE 
ITALIAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, (2006). 
106. Id. 
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3. French Law 
French law enforces the arbitral agreement when it has been 
decided by the parties.107 In particular, the French Court of Cassation 
interprets the manifest nullity exception narrowly.108 There are several 
instances where French law contradicts the U.S. legal rules. Under 
French law, the relation between arbitral tribunal and the court is 
inverted. The courts are authorized to decide, prima facie, jurisdictional 
issues when it is clear the parties did not intend to address arbitration, 
or they accidentally enforced an invalid arbitral agreement.109 If arbitral 
proceedings have been commenced, the arbitrators are exclusively 
empowered to decide the jurisdictional issue, even if the award may be 
challenged before the courts. 
CONCLUSION 
The comparative evaluation shown through the recent trend of the 
U.S. Supreme Court on the delegation clause and the arbitrability issue 
highlight new considerations of the Model Law suggestions. While 
there is a dependence on the judiciary in implementing the arbitration 
effectively, Henry Schein can contribute to overcoming the impasse 
between the competence-competence declamation and the court’s 
active role in resolving threshold issues of arbitration proceedings. 
First, there must be a change in approach to avoid a predominant 
role of the court when the parallel proceeding is brought, particularly if 
the arbitral tribunal is not yet constituted. How long does the conflict 
between jurisdictions need to continue in order to resolve the 
jurisdictional issue? It is too soon to know whether Henry Schein will 
be a turning point on this transnational matter of arbitration 
proceedings. However, using a comparative approach, this article 
attempts to evaluate whether Henry Schein and its rationale in the U.S. 
could offer a renewed perspective to the European legal context. 
According to the U.S. legal system, when a specific rule 
establishing the competence-competence principle as a cornerstone 
does not exist, the Supreme Court enhances the parties’ consent to 
 
107. Susler, supra note 85, at 122. 
108. Id. at 13. 
109. William Park, Challenging Arbitral Jurisdiction: The Role of Institutional 
Rules, No. 15-40 Boston University School of Law, Public Research Paper (2015). 
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arbitrators deciding jurisdictional issues. The matter is traditionally 
approached irrespective of the possibility of parallel proceedings 
because arbitral proceedings in accordance with the parties’ choice has 
been favored. However, the question remains whether this choice can 
be considered as clear and unmistakable. This question is not crucial 
and, ultimately, returns to correctly drafting the arbitral agreement and 
delegation clause.110 
Nevertheless, the potential impact from Henry Schein, beyond the 
United States, stems from the absence of a specific rule focusing on the 
competence-competence principle. The relevant points of Henry Schein 
are undoubted when viewed through the lens of a European legal 
scholar. Henry Schein offers food for thought regarding innovative 
considerations, mainly for all legal systems that have a specific 
provision on that principle. In other words, in accordance with 
arbitration’s purpose, arbitrators must have exclusive power in deciding 
gateway issues whenever parties request it. The willingness of the 
parties to choose arbitration in lieu of judicial litigation dominates in 
determining whether arbitrators or the court must take the lead in 
deciding jurisdictional issues. 
Additionally, Henry Schein introduces an argument which properly 
highlights the bias related to the parallel proceeding brought to the 
court. It “inevitably spark[s] collateral litigation” and creates “such a 
time-consuming sideshow.”111 Honoring an explicit agreement by 
parties for an arbitrator to decide jurisdictional threshold issues includes 
a twofold policy. First, it enhances the crucial standpoint of arbitration 
proceedings, as the parties agree to resolve their disputes out of the 
court. Second, in doing so, it makes the competence-competence 
principle effective, even though it does not directly apply to statutory 
law. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider parties’ consent to 
arbitration where the governing law does not acknowledge the 
competence-competence principle. 
There is a partial similarity between the Court’s solution in Henry 
Schein, enhancing the parties’ willingness through the effectiveness of 
the delegation clause, and the so-called negative effect of the 
 
110. Charles B. Rosenberg, Henry Schein v. Archer & White: A Lesson in the 
Importance of Carefully Drafting an Arbitration Clause, 8 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 381, 
393 (2020).   
111. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 531 
(2019). 
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competence-competence principle set directly by the law. There is a 
difference between a system that recognizes the arbitrator’s exclusive 
power to determine its jurisdiction, if parties want it, and the system 
that tries to achieve this result by statutory law. If the attribution of this 
power is a natural corollary of the establishment of equal status for the 
arbitrators and the ordinary courts when exercising judicial powers, 
then it is necessary to understand how to guarantee the autonomy of 
arbitration whenever the law, and not the delegation clause, provides.   
The possibility of disputing arbitrability before the courts (and 
generally the allocation of jurisdiction on the merits) whenever the 
arbitral tribunal has constituted, undermines arbitration autonomy. It 
provides guarantees to the parties only if the court subsequently finds 
that it has exclusive jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the court upholds 
the jurisdiction of the arbitrators, and if arbitral proceedings are not yet 
pending, there will be the twofold defect of not defending arbitration 
autonomy, causing it to be inefficient, deferring its launch, and 
undermining one of the reasons why the parties committed to the 
arbitration agreement. Moreover, if the arbitration has launched and 
pursued pending a decision by the courts, the arbitrators will have 
exposed the parties to a potential inefficiency whenever the court 
subsequently denied the arbitral jurisdiction.   
The French model notably offers an interesting solution, so that it 
is no surprise that this model is typical of the international conventions 
adopted in the area of arbitration and international trade. This model is 
sensitive to the parties’ intention to adopt the arbitration mechanism for 
resolving disputes as an alternative to the jurisdiction of the courts. The 
French model is centred on the so-called negative effect of the 
competence-competence principle, which requires the court to defer to 
the arbitrators regarding questions of jurisdiction. This has the effect of 
rendering the court’s role in that decision minimal. The court intervenes 
only to consider whether the arbitration agreement is prima facie 
manifestly incapable of establishing the arbitral jurisdiction on the 
merits. After a full review the court establishes jurisdiction by a binding 
decision, deciding either on the merits of the dispute (if the party filed 
such a request) or deciding only on the issue of jurisdiction, if the party 
apprised the courts of the matter exclusively for that purpose. In any 
case, pending a decision by the courts, it will not be possible to either 
launch or pursue arbitral proceedings. 
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This solution suggests a complementary role for the court which is 
capable of using parallel proceedings as an instrument for arriving at a 
preliminary and effective solution to the “gateway issue” and not as a 
potential delaying tactic by one of the parties. There are two aspects to 
this solution: first, the prima facie prognosis that the arbitration 
agreement is null and void, and second, the automatic staying of the 
arbitration whenever the court arrives at a due assessment following a 
full review that the arbitral tribunal lacks jurisdiction. This is the best 
solution because it tries to avoid the parallel proceedings regarding 
arbitral jurisdiction. 
Thus, Henry Schein introduces renewed considerations and 
provides a different perspective on this issue, aiming for a more uniform 
and harmonized provision. This solution addresses the crucial role of 
the parties’ consent to arbitration and the outstanding American 
doctrine on “contracting for procedure,” as noted in the Introduction of 
this article. 
The turning point between the U.S. system and the Europeans 
system is undoubtedly the provision of the competence-competence 
principle. This kind of provision makes it difficult to strike an 
appropriate balance between legitimacy and efficiency of the arbitral 
proceedings. The parallel proceedings appear to naturally follow that 
principle. 
On the contrary, the U.S. delegation clause and the recent 
interpretation offered by Henry Schein centres on the parties’ full-size 
role. It also demonstrates the risk of inefficient arbitration stemming 
from concerns over wasting time and money, while fully and effectively 
safeguarding the original agreement, thereby disallowing arbitral 
jurisdiction decision from the organs of public justice. While the U.S. 
arbitration system does not expressly provide guidance on the 
competence-competence principle, it does grant the parties, who have 
agreed to arbitration, a more consistent application of the arbitrators’ 
powers and duties. 
The milestone that emerges from Henry Schein is, in sum, the 
crucial role assumed by the parties’ intent, a precise statutory provision, 
and delegating the decision on threshold jurisdictional issues to the 
arbitral tribunal. Accordingly, within the systems expressly providing 
the prior arbitrators’ power in so deciding, the parties should expect a 
twofold chance to preserve their will for having chosen arbitration 
proceeding. 
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With unchanged regulatory provisions, parties could contract 
domestic and country-specific arbitration procedures, introducing a 
delegation clause to enhance the declamation of the competence-
competence principle. Alternatively, the U.S. system should change 
regulatory provisions, requiring declamation to be more effective. It 
should also directly provide the so-called negative effect of this 
principle. The parties should play a central role, precisely avoiding 
these negative effects and requiring the concurrent jurisdiction of courts 
in deciding all gateway issues. 
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